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TRIAL JUDGES-GATEKEEPERS OR
USURPERS? CAN THE TRIAL JUDGE
CRITICALLY ASSESS THE ADMISSIBILITY
OF EXPERT TESTIMONY WITHOUT
INVADING THE JURY'S PROVINCE TO
EVALUATE THE CREDIBILITY AND
WEIGHT OF THE TESTIMONY?
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED'
"It is commonly said that... 'questions of fact' [are] for the jury. ,2
"Credibility determinations are the exclusive province of the jury."3
There are a number of common generalizations about the respective
roles of the jury and judge at American trials. One bromide is that the
jury resolves "questions of fact.",4 At first blush, that bromide seems to
hold true. After all, the constitutional right a to civil jury trial is
guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution,5 and the right to a criminal jury trial is similarly secured by
1. Professor of Law, University of California, at Davis. B.A., 1967; J.D., 1969,
University of San Francisco; former Chair, Evidence Section, American Association of Law
Schools.
2. HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 349-62 (1994). Coke's famous maxim, "Ad
questionem facti non respondent judices... " meant that "judges do not answer questions of
fact." J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 185-
87 (1898); 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2549, at 639-40 (J. Chadboum, rev. ed. 1981).
3. United States v. Cisneros, 203 F.3d 333, 343 (5th Cir. 2000) ("Credibility
determinations are the exclusive province of the jury."); David E. Seidelson, Conditional
Relevancy and Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b), 47 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1048,1059 (1979).
4. HART & SACKS, supra note 2, at 349-62.
5. See U.S. CONST., amend. VII.
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the Sixth Amendment.6 The latter right is so fundamental that a trial
judge may not direct a verdict against an accused even when the
prosecution evidence is overwhelming and the defense submits no
rebuttal testimony.8
The difficulty is that on close scrutiny, the generalization breaks
down. Although the jury has the primary authority to decide the factual
questions on the merits of the case, another type of factual issue often
arises at trial-questions that condition the admissibility of evidence.9
Suppose, for example, that at trial, the proponent offers testimony about
an out-of-court statement under the common-law excited utterance
hearsay exception." The judge determines the admissibility of proffered
evidence. When the item of proffered evidence is an alleged excited
utterance, the trial judge must decide whether the declarant was in a
state of nervous excitement at the time of the statement." That question
is factual in nature: the resolution of the question requires the trial
judge to decide whether, at a particular date and time, the declarant was
in a certain frame of mind. Or suppose that the opponent objects to the
introduction of testimony about an out-of-court statement on the
ground that the statement was a confidential spousal communication
and thus privileged at common law. In order to pass on that objection,
the judge must decide whether the declarant spouse intended the
revelation to remain secret. Once again, the decision turns on a factual
determination: the judge must attempt to reconstruct history and decide
whether, at the time of the revelation, the declarant had the requisite
state of mind.
The trial judge not only enjoys the power to make these factual
determinations under the common law; the judge's power has also been
6. See U.S. CONST. at amend. VI.
7. See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986); Smelcher v. Attorney Gen., 947 F.2d 1472,
1476 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Goings, 517 F.2d 891 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Bosch, 505 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Lee, 483 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1973).
8. See United States v. Jones, 108 F.3d 668, 671 (6th Cir. 1997)("As a general rule, a
verdict cannot be directed in favor of the prosecution no matter how strong the evidence
against the defendant"); United States v. Raether, 82 F.3d 192 (8th Cir. 1996); United States
v. Jerke, 896 F. Supp. 962, 964 (D.S.D. 1995)("no matter how overwhelming the evidence of
guilt"), affd sub nom.; Bryan v. United States, 373 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1967); People v. Lawson,
234 Cal. Rptr. 557, 560 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); United States v. England, 347 F.2d 425,426 (7th
Cir. 1965).
9. See FED. R. EVID. 104; CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 403-405 (West 1995).
10. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
11. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Determining Preliminary Facts Under Federal Rule 104, in
45 AM. JUR. TRIALS § 50 (1992).
12. See id. at § 42.
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codified by the Federal Rules of Evidence. In pertinent part, Federal
Rule of Evidence 104(a) reads:
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions
concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the
existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be
determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision
(b).13
Rule 104(b) adds:
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy of
evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the
court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of
evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the
condition.14
The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 104(a) declares that when a
question conditions the technical admissibility of evidence, the decision
is "made by the judge."15 The Note explains that "[t]o the extent that
these inquiries are factual, the judge acts as a trier of fact." 1 6 The Note
states that when the judge functions in that capacity, "the judge will of
necessity receive evidence pro and con on the [factual] issue."1 7
The nature of judicial rulings under Rule 104(a) calls into question
another bromide about the allocation of fact-finding power at American
trials, namely, the generalization that jurors decide the credibility of
witnesses.'8 When, in the context of a 104(a) ruling, the judge must
resolve a factual question on a record containing "evidence pro and
con,""9 the judge sometimes has to weigh the credibility of the
foundational testimony. The leading federal precedent on Rule 104(a)
is the Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Bourjaily v. United States.
20
There, the Court noted that when judges pass on factual questions under
13. FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
14. FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
15. FED. R. EVID. 104(a) advisory committee note.
16. Id.
17. Id
18. See United States v. Cisneros, 203 F.3d 333, 343 (5th Cir. 2000); Seidelson, supra note
3, at 1059.
19. FED. R. EVID. 104(a) advisory committee note.
20. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
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Rule 104(a), they "act as factfinders. ',2' The Court stated that in that
capacity, the judge is entitled to determine the "weight" of the evidence
submitted pro and con." A year later, in Huddleston v. United States,7
3
the Court handed down the foremost precedent on Rule 104(b). The
Court contrasted the judge's limited role under Rule 104(b) with the
judge's broader authority under Rule 104(a).24 In expounding on the
contrast, the Court stated that under 104(b), the judge "neither weighs
credibility nor makes a finding" of fact.25 Thus, the Court recognized
that when Rule 104(a) controls a judge's ruling on a factual issue
conditioning the technical admissibility of evidence, the judge may
consider the credibility of the foundational testimony submitted pro and
con.
The Court's pronouncements about Rule 104(a) took on greater
importance in 1993 when the Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,26 the landmark decision on the admissibility
of purportedly scientific testimony. Substantively, the Daubert Court
held that the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 had
impliedly overturned the traditional Frye general acceptance test for
determining the admissibility of scientific evidence.27 However, the
Court was quick to add that the repeal of the general acceptance
standard did not mean that trials will become a "free-for-all" '' at which
purportedly scientific testimony is routinely admissible. Rather, the
Court ruled that to be admissible, such testimony must qualify as
reliable "scientific... knowledge" within the meaning of that expression
in Federal Rule of Evidence 702.29 The Court announced an essentially
methodological test for determining the admissibility of such
testimony.' Out of respect for the jury's role, the Court cautioned that
the trial judge is not to decide the validity of "the conclusion[] ...
generate[d]" by the expert's methodology.3' That conclusion is the item
21. Id. at 180.
22. Id. at 181.
23. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
24. See id. at 690.
25. Id.
26. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
27. See id. at 585-89.
28. Id. at 595.
29. Id. at 590.
30. See id. at 592-93.
31. Id.
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of proffered evidence32 ultimately to be submitted to the jury. Instead,
the judge is to focus on the foundation for the proffered evidence, that
is, the "principles and methodology" used to "generate" the expert's
conclusion.33 The foundation must demonstrate that the expert's
ultimate conclusion was "derived by the scientific method. Proposed
testimony must be supported by appropriate validation-i.e., 'good
grounds' .... "
Procedurally, the Daubert Court made it clear that the judge's ruling
on this foundational question falls within the ambit of Federal Rule
104(a). The Court contemplated "a gatekeeping role for the judge., 35
The Court asserted that the Federal Rules "assign to the trial judge the
task of ensuring that an expert's testimony.., rests on a reliable
foundation. "' The Court expressly stated that the judge is to discharge
that task "pursuant to Rule 104(a)." 37
The Court's substantive decision in Daubert has generated a
mountain of literature.' However, to date there has been little
commentary on the procedural facets of the Court's decision.39 With the
exception of less than a handful of articles, 4° the commentators have
largely ignored the procedural issues posed by the administration of the
Daubert Court's new validation test. For instance, although the
Advisory Committee Note to Rule 104(a) states that the judge may
consider both "pro" evidence submitted by the proponent and "con"
evidence submitted by the opponent,41 it is not even settled whether the
opponent's "con" evidence can take the form of testimony attacking the
credibility of the proponent's "pro" witnesses.
The neglect of the procedural aspects of Daubert is understandable.
32. CAL EVID. CODE § 401 (West 1995).
33. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
34. Id. at 590.
35. Id. at 597.
36. Id.
37. Id at 592.
38. See, e.g., 1 DAVID L FAIGMAN, ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW
AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (1999 Supp.) (collecting citations); 1 PAUL C.
GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1-7 (3d ed. 1999)
(collecting citations).
39. Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Final Commen1" The Importance of the Procedural
Framework, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 669 (2000).
40. See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, Procedural Paradigms for Applying the Daubert Test,
78 MINN. L. REV. 1345 (1994); Harvey Brown, Procedural Issues Under Daubert, 36 HOUS.
L. REV. 1133 (1999).
41. FED. R. EVID. 104(a) advisory committee note.
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There has long been a dearth of both case law and scholarly
commentary on the question of the extent to which the trial judge may
factor the credibility of foundational testimony into a decision under
Rule 104(a). Even the most in-depth, multi-volume evidence treatises
are largely silent on the question. 2 For that reason, it should come as no
surprise that on the two recent occasions when the issue has arisen, the
courts reached differing results. In one case, a federal district court
ruled that the opponent could not cross-examine the proponent's
witness to expose a bias relevant to the witness's credibility.43 However,
in a subsequent 1999 decision, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that a federal district court properly excluded proffered
scientific testimony as incredible because the proponent's expert had
been impeached by prior deposition testimony inconsistent with his
foundational testimony.4  In the appellate court's view, the
inconsistency justified the trial judge in finding that the witness's
foundational testimony was "untruthful[]. '"4'  However, the appellate
court majority reached this conclusion over a vigorous dissent by Chief
Judge Becker,46 one of the leading judicial authorities on Evidence. 7
The dissent protested that the trial judge had "confuse[d] the reliability
of an expert witness-a matter for the jury-with the reliability of his or
her methodology-a matter initially for the trial judge."48 Chief Judge
Becker argued that the evidence of the witness's prior inconsistent
statements was "irrelevant" to the trial judge's decision under Rule
104(a). 9
In all probability, the importance of this procedural question will
grow in the near future. To begin with, the use of expert testimony is
likely to increase. In a Rand Corporation study of the use of expert
42. See 1 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 24 (2d ed. 1994); 1 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 104.11 (2d ed. 2000); 21 CHARLES
A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
EVIDENCE § 5053 (1977).
43. See Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1396 n.24 (D. Or. 1996);
Brown, supra note 40, at 1151.
44. See In re UNISYS Say. Plan Litig., 173 F.3d 145, 156 (3rd Cir. 1999).
45. Id.
46. See id. at 161-74 (Becker, C.J., dissenting).
47. See, e.g., Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After
Sixteen Years-The Effect of 'Plain Meaning' Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory
Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 60
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857 (1992).
48. UNISYS, 173 F.3d at 161 (Becker, C.J., dissenting).
49. Id.
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testimony in California courts of general jurisdiction, the researchers
found that "[e]xperts testified in 86% of the[] civil jury trials."5 The
researchers discovered that "[iln nearly three quarters of the trials in
which experts testified (or 63% of all trials) there were experts on both
sides."' Moreover, in 1999 the Supreme Court extended the reach of
Daubert to non-scientific expert testimony. In Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v.
Carmichael,' the Court decided that all species of expert testimony are
subject to "Daubert style scrutiny. " 4  The Court stated that the
proponent cannot escape from a "gatekeeping inquiry"55 by the simple
expedient of labeling the proffered testimony non-scientific. The
judge's "gatekeeping obligation" applies to all types of expert
testimony.
Indeed, the importance of this question transcends expert testimony
cases. The fundamental issue is the allocation of factfinding power
between the trial judge and jury. Respected commentators have
expressed alarm at a gradual trend to expand the judge's authority at the
expense of the petit jury.5 They contend that as a result of this trend,
judges are increasingly "resolv[ing] factual disputes that go to the heart
of the case, thereby invading the province of the jury."' In short, this
neglected procedural issue implicates the future of the jury as a
democratic institution. Given that implication and the incidence of the
use of expert testimony, it is imperative to address the procedural
question.
The thesis of this short article is that in resolving factual disputes
under Rule 104(a), to a degree, trial judges should be permitted to
consider the opponent's evidence impeaching the credibility of the
proponent's foundational testimony. To develop that thesis, this article
proceeds in four steps. The first section of this article describes the early
American law that governed the judge's power to find facts determining
the admissibility of testimony. At that juncture in our legal history, the
trial judge decided every question of fact conditioning the application of
50. See Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIs. L. REv. 1113,1113 *
51. Md at 1119.
52. ld. at 1120.
53. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
54. Id. at 158.
55. Id. at 150.
56. lId at 147.
57. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Standards of Proof and Preliminary Questions of Fact, 27
STAN. L. REV. 271 (1975).
58. ld at 272 n.3.
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all evidentiary rules. The second section shifts to the modem era. That
section describes the contemporary state of the law under Rule 104 and
explains that in some cases governed by Rule 104(b), the trial judge no
longer possesses plenary factfinding power. Further, the section clarifies
that in other cases controlled by Rule 104(a), the trial judge still enjoys
true factfinding power. However, the section notes that even at this late
date, it is still unsettled the extent to which a judge under 104(a) should
permit the opponent to introduce evidence attacking the credibility of
the proponent's foundational testimony.
The remaining sections of this article are primarily evaluative. The
third section identifies the policy factors which should influence the
extent to which a trial judge ought to allow the opponent to submit
evidence attacking the credibility of the proponent's foundational
testimony. The fourth section uses these policy factors to evaluate three
possible models for the scope of the judge's factfinding under Rule
104(a). The section argues for a compromise model that accords the
judge limited authority to consider impeaching evidence that bears with
relative directness on a genuine credibility dispute over the proponent's
foundational testimony. Finally, positing the compromise model, the
section exemplifies both impeaching evidence the judge should arguably
be allowed to consider and evidence exceeding the judge's limited
authority.
I. A DESCRIPTION OF THE EARLY AMERICAN LAW THAT GOVERNED
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE FACTUAL
QUESTIONS CONDITIONING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
The state of the early law can be described simply and briefly: the
judge had plenary authority to decide all the questions of fact
conditioning the admissibility of testimony.9 The traditional English
view was that the judge determined all foundational or preliminary
facts.6 English judges considered the testimony on both sides of the
foundational testimony and resolved any incidental questions of
59. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide Questions of
Preliminary Facts Conditioning the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence?, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 577,583 (1984).
60. See JOHN MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 212, 230-31
(1947).
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credibility.1 Even after the American Revolution, American courts
tended to follow the British practice.63 It became a virtual "article of
faith" that the trial judge's authority encompassed the determination of
all factual questions conditioning the admissibility of proffered
evidence." This was not only the early common-law conception of the
judge's authority; this conception was likewise codified in Rule 8 of the
Uniform Rules of Evidence," Rule 11 of the Model Code of Evidence,
and state statutes such as California Code of Civil Procedure § 2102
adopted in 1872.6 In short, until the modem era, there was virtually
universal agreement that whenever the application of an evidentiary
rule to an item of proffered testimony necessitated the resolution of a
factual question, the judge-and the judge alone-decided the
question.'
II. A DESCRIPTION OF THE MODERN AMERICAN LAW GOVERNING
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S AUTHORrTY
A. The Attack on the Expansive, English View of the Judge's Authority
As we have seen, the early American courts unquestioningly
followed the English view, which empowered the trial judge to decide
every factual question conditioning the application of an evidentiary
rule. However, that view was eventually challenged. The leading critics
were Jacksonian democrats.6' The Jacksonians were fearful of a
powerful, aristocratic judiciary. For that reason, they favored the
popular election of judges.'
More importantly, the Jacksonians advocated a shift of preliminary
61. See id.
62. See id. at 212.
63. John Maguire & Charles Epstein, Preliminary Questions of Fact in Determining the
Admissibility of Evidence, 40 HARV. L. REV. 392,392 (1927). See also WRIGHT & GRAHAM,
supra note 42, at §§ 5052-5053 (1977).
64. UNIF. R. EVID. 8, reprinted in WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 42, at § 5051, at 241
n.3.
65. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 11 (1942).
66. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2102 (1872) (repealed 1965).
67. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 42, at § 5052, at 249-50.
68. See id. § 5052, at 251 (1977).
69. See Id.; Donald T. Weckstein, Round Table Discussion of the Proposed Code of
Judicial Conduct, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 785,817 (1972).
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factfinding power to the jury.0 If the judge has plenary power to decide
all the foundational facts conditioning the admissibility of evidence, as a
practical matter the judge can undermine the jurors' power to resolve
the facts on the merits of the case." "[T]he functioning of the jury as a
trier of fact [c]ould be greatly restricted and in some cases virtually
destroyed."'t In a civil case, the judge might choose to disbelieve all the
plaintiff's foundational testimony. Having done so, the judge could
exclude all the items of evidence proffered by the plaintiff. At that
point, the judge could peremptorily enter judgment for the defendant on
the ground that the plaintiff had presented no evidence to sustain its
initial burden of production or going forward. Thus, the judge could
abuse his or her preliminary factfinding power to dictate the result in the
case. There would be a similar potential for abuse in criminal cases. By
purporting to disbelieve all of an accused's foundational testimony, the
judge could preclude the introduction of vital exculpatory evidence.
Even if the Sixth Amendment prevented the trial judge from directing
the jury to return a guilty verdict, in some cases the judge could make a
guilty finding a foregone conclusion.
B. The Responses to the Attacks: The Emergence of the Modem
Competence-Conditional Relevance Dichotomy in Judicial Factfinding
1. The Common Law
After the Jacksonian critique of the traditional English view, a few,
isolated American opinions deviated from the English practice.'
However, the major inroads on the English practice did not occur until
the 1920s.74 Late in that decade, three commentators, Epstein, Maguire,
and Morgan, helped develop a new approach to foundational or
preliminary factfinding.'
The new theory was responsive to the democratic critique of the
traditional English view. The new theory shifted to the jury all the
70. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 42, § 5052, at 251.
71. See MAGUIRE, supra note 60, at 218; Charles V. Laughlin, Preliminary Questions of
Fact A New Theory, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 285, 302 (1974); Maguire & Epstein, supra
note 63, at 397.
72. FED. R. EVID. 104(b) advisory committee note.
73. See, e.g., Patton v. Bank of La Fayette, 53 S.E. 664 (Ga. 1906); Winslow v. Bailey, 16
Me. 319 (1839).
74. See Laughlin, supra note 71, at 286.
75. Maguire & Epstein, supra note 63, at 392; Edmund Morgan, Functions of Judge and
Jury in the Determination of Preliminary Questions of Fact, 43 HARV. L. REV. 165 (1929).
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preliminary factfinding power which the commentors believed lay jurors
could be trusted with. In particular, the theory posited that the jury
should be able to decide whether a lay witness has personal knowledge
of the event he or she proposes testifying about.7 6 The argument was not
simply that lay jurors were competent to decide whether the witness was
in fact at the intersection at the time of the collision the witness
contemplated describing. More fundamentally, allocating the jury the
power to make that decision did not imperil the integrity of their later
deliberations in the case. Assume that the jury decided that the witness
did not observe the accident; the jury finds that the witness is lying or
mistaken. On that assumption, common sense would ordinarily lead the
jury to disregard the witness's testimony about the accident during the
balance of their deliberations. Thus, even if the jury is exposed to the
foundational testimony and the foundational fact turns out to be false,
the exposure will not distort the jury's deliberations about the merits of
the case.
Based on the same reasoning, the theory assigns the jury the power
to decide whether an exhibit such as a letter is authentic.' If the jury
determines that the letter is a forgery, once again they should naturally8
disregard the letter's contents during their deliberations. If the plaintiff
proffers the letter as an admission by the defendant but the jury finds
that the defendant did not author the letter, it will be evident to the jury
that they should attach no weight to the letter.
These issues are usually designated "conditional relevance"
questions.7 In an elementary sense, these facts condition the logical
relevance of the evidence. If the witness is called to testify about an
accident but the witness lacks firsthand knowledge, the jury will
naturally dismiss the witness's testimony as worthless. Similarly, if the
prosecution claims that the defendant mailed a threatening letter to a
witness but the jury concludes that the defendant did not write the
letter, the jurors will probably put the letter aside during their
deliberations. In the words of the California Assembly Committee on
Judiciary,
76. See FED. R. EVID. 602.
77. See FED. R. EVID. 901.
78. See United States v. James, 576 F.2d 1121, 1129 (5th Cir. 1978) ("the jury's own
natural inclination to ignore what it considers irrelevant").
79. See FED. R. EVID. 104(b) advisory committee note; FED. R. EVID. 602 advisory
committee note; FED. R. EVID. 901 advisory committee note.
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Frequently, the jury's duty to disregard conditionally admissible
evidence when it is not persuaded of the existence of the
preliminary fact on which relevancy is conditioned is so clear that
an instruction to this effect is unnecessary. For example, if the
disputed preliminary fact is the authenticity of a deed, it hardly
seems necessary to instruct the jury to disregard the deed if it
should find that the deed is not genuine. No rational jury could
find the deed to be spurious and, yet, to be still effective to
transfer title from the purported grantor.!
In contrast, even the proponents of the new theory acknowledged
that it is necessary to apply the English view to many foundational facts.
To distinguish those facts from facts conditioning the fundamental
logical relevance of proffered evidence, the theory characterizes the
former facts as conditioning the "competence" of the evidence.81 The
facts conditioning the application of a privilege such as attorney-client
are illustrative. One of the foundational facts is that the client's
communication with his or her attorney occurred in physical privacyY
Suppose that the accused were charged with a heinous offense such as
murdering an infant and that the prosecution had testimony from an
eavesdroppers that the accused had confessed the crime to his attorney.
The prosecution claims that the conversation was not private because
the client knew that a third party was standing within easy earshot, but
the client denies that the third person was present at the time. In this
situation, realistically the lay jurors cannot be trusted to administer the
privilege doctrine.' Even if they found that the attorney-client
communication was confidential and technically privileged, during any
later deliberations at the subconscious level they might nevertheless be
influenced by their exposure to the testimony about the confession.'
For that matter, at a conscious level some jurors might be tempted to
80. Assembly Comm. Jud. Comment, CAL. EVID. CODE § 403, quoted in
IMWINKELRIED & HALLAHAN'S CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE CODE ANNOTATED 33 (2000).
81. See Morgan, supra note 75, at 165 n.2.
82. See Assembly Comm. Jud. Comment, CAL. EVID. CODE § 405, quoted in
IMWINKELRIED & HALLAHAN, supra note 80, at 36.
83. While the early common law permitted eavesdroppers to testify to otherwise
privileged communications, the modem view is contra. 1 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 74.
84. See Saltzburg, supra note 57, at 271 ("trepidations as to the ability of jurors").
85. See United States v. James, 576 F.2d 1121, 1127-32 (5th Cir. 1978) (explaining why
the determination of the voluntariness of a confession should be allocated to the trial judge:
after exposure to a confession, the jurors might be "influenced by its belief that the
confession, even though coerced was true;" it is "unrealistic" to think that the lay jurors
would not be "swayed" by the foundational testimony).
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consider the inadmissible confession; it might strike them that applying
the "technical" evidentiary rule would frustrate substantive justice and
set a guilty person free. In short,
No one doubts the jury's competence to decide whether a person
was physically present when the attorney and client conversed;
the issue of a person's presence at a particular time and place is a
simple, straightforward question that jurors can easily resolve.
Yet we routinely assign the determination of that preliminary
fact to the judge. We do so because the jury, having heard the
foundational proof and the contents of the proffered privileged
communication, will have difficulty complying with an instruction
to disregard the communication [even] if they decide that it was
privileged."
This reasoning helps rationalize the courts' decision to allocate the
decision over the foundational fact of the methodological validity of a
scientific theory to the trial judgeY Just as the jury is competent to
decide the issue of a person's presence at a particular time and place, the
Daubert Court expressed its faith in the jury's ability to determine the
weight to be assigned to scientific evidence. The Court rejected the
views of those who are "overly pessimistic about the capabilities of the
jury " sitting in cases where the parties rely on scientific testimony. The
critical point, though, is that as in the case of privilege foundations, if the
jury were exposed to the foundational testimony on the scientific
evidence and found the evidence technically inadmissible, there would
be a grave risk that the foundational testimony would nevertheless
distort their subsequent deliberations.
That risk arises from the concurrence of several characteristics of
scientific evidence. To begin with, foundations for scientific testimony
tend to be much lengthier than foundations for other evidence. A
foundation, demonstrating a lay witness's personal knowledge,' could
be quite short, consuming only half a page of the trial record. However,
in one case involving a challenge to radar speedmeter evidence, the out-
of-court admissibility hearing generated "over 2000 pages of testimony
86. Imwinkelried, supra note 59, at 615 (citations omitted).
87. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993); People v.
King, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478,492 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
88. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
89. See FED. R. EVID. 602.
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and arguments."' ° The admissibility hearing in a DNA case "took place
over a twelve week period producing a transcript of approximately five
thousand pages."9 Common sense suggests that "when jurors listen to
hours of foundational scientific proof, they will have difficulty
[completely] ignoring the proof during their deliberations [even if] they
find that the preliminary fact does not exist."'
A psychological factor magnifies the risk:
The... literature on memory [indicates that i]f a person
processes information thoroughly, his memory of that
information will be stronger. Although the extent of processing
is not directly proportional to the difficulty of comprehension,
the person's struggle to understand the information may enhance
the depth of processing, and that greater depth should make the
memory stronger. [Greater depth of processing] ... makes the
memory of information less subject to decay. If a conscientious
juror makes an earnest effort to understand.., hours of
foundational scientific testimony, the juror [may] be... unable
to disregard the testimony completely during the final
deliberations. The juror may forget many of the details of the
testimony, but the overall impression left by the testimony will
be difficult to repress.'
Finally, the overtly probabilistic nature of the foundational
testimony for scientific evidence increases the risk that the jurors would
be unable to set aside the testimony during their deliberations even if at
a conscious level they decided that the evidence was technically
inadmissible. In the case of other foundational questions such as a lay
witness's personal knowledge or a letter's authenticity, the jurors are
inclined to conceive of the question as a categorical issue. Either the
witness viewed the accident, or she did not. Either the defendant wrote
the letter, or he did not.9' In contrast, the foundational testimony for a
scientific theory or technique is often explicitly probabilistic, identifying
the margin of error for the scientific hypothesis.9 For example, the
testimony might indicate that while the technique works accurately 60%
90. State v. Aquilera, 25 Cr. L. (BNA) 2189 (Fla. County Ct. May 7, 1979).
91. People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 986 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
92. Imwinkelried, supra note 59, at 605.
93. Id. at 605-06 (citations omitted).
94. See id. at 600-01.
95. See ihL at 601.
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of the time, there is a 40% margin of error. Assume that based on this
record, the jurors conclude that the technique is too error prone to be
admissible. Yet,
[T]he jurors might be unable to disregard the testimony about
the scientific technique [during their later deliberations]. The
jurors know that the technique works sometimes; the
foundational testimony indicates that the technique often works.
The proponent's expert may be eminently qualified, one of the
preeminent authorities in the field. The jurors may be tempted
to conclude that the expert's exceptional credentials compensate
for the technique's margin of error ... [S]ubconsciously they
might suspect that the superbly qualified expert on the stand
could make the technique work. Thus, the jury's ability to
disregard the evidence is doubtful...
In light of these considerations, it was understandable that the
common law would assign the trial judge the task of resolving the
questions of fact conditioning the admissibility of scientific testimony.'
2. The Federal Rules of Evidence
Just as the Daubert Court chose to follow the common law" in
announcing that Rule 104(a) governed the foundation for a proffer of
scientific evidence.' the drafters of the Federal Rules relied on the
modem common law theory of preliminary factfinding in shaping
Federal Rules of Evidence 104(a) and 104(b). The Advisory Committee
Note expressly cites the most famous works on the subject by Epstein,
Maguire and Morgan."° Rule 104(a) governs facts conditioning the
competence of evidence. As the statute reads, those factual questions
"shall be determined by" the trial judge.'° The accompanying Advisory
Committee Note explains that in this setting, the judge "determine[s]"
the facts in the broad sense that he or she "acts as a trier of fact." 102 At
the same time, Rule 104(b) controls facts conditioning the fundamental
96. IL at 602-03.
97. See People v. King, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478,492 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
98. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993); King, 72 Cal.
Rptr. at 478.
99. Id.
100. See FED. R. EVID. 104 advisory committee note.
101. FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
102. FED. R. EVID. 104(a) advisory committee note.
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probative worth of the evidence. The statute provides that Rule 104(b)
applies "[w]hen the [very] relevancy of evidence depends upon the
fulfillment of a condition of fact"'O' such as a lay witness's personal
knowledge or an exhibit's genuineness. Unlike Rule 104(a), Rule
104(b) does not authorize the judge to "determine[]" the factual
question. Rather, Rule 104(b) states that the judge "admit[s the
proffered evidence] upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence
sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition."'"
Thus, the judge does not determine as a factfinder, for example,
whether the witness observed the traffic accident. The judge plays a
more limited role; the judge's inquiry is confined to determining
whether the record contains sufficient foundational testimony to permit
rational jurors to conclude that the witness saw the accident.
C. The Specific Procedures Used to Implement the Modem Dichotomy
Between FactsConditioning the Logical Relevance of Proffered Evidence
and Those Conditioning the Competence of the Evidence
The wording of Rules 104(a) and 104(b) generally suggests the
procedures which trial judges should use to implement the statutes. The
courts have elaborated on those procedures. For the most part, the
courts are now in agreement over the proper procedures under the two
statutes.
For instance, there is a consensus, that under Rule 104(b), the judge
plays a limited, screening role. By the terms of the statute, the judge is
authorized to address only one question, namely, whether the
proponent has "introduc[ed] ... evidence sufficient to support a finding
of the fulfillment of the condition" such as a lay witness's personal
knowledge."° Thus, in the typical case the judge need not consider any
contrary testimony by the opponent; the judge's task is restricted to
assessing the sufficiency of the proponent's foundational testimony to
permit a rational juror to find that the foundational fact is true. As the
Supreme Court itself remarked in Huddleston, a judge ruling under
104(b) "neither weighs credibility nor makes a [true] finding" of fact.Y
After evaluating the sufficiency of the proponent's foundational
testimony, the judge rules immediately on the objection; and the
opponent submits any rebuttal testimony to the jurors rather than the
103. FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988).
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judge. The true fact finding is to be made by the jurors.'" The jurors
make the ultimate decision whether the lay witness actually observed
the accident or whether the purported author wrote the letter. At the
admissibility stage the trial judge must accept the proponent's
foundational testimony at face value. The judge limits his or her
analysis to the following question: if the jury decides to believe the
testimony, cumulatively does the testimony have sufficient probative
value to support a permissive inference of the existence of the
foundational fact? On the opponent's request, during the final jury
charge the judge will instruct the jury that: the proponent has the
burden of persuading the jurors that the foundational fact is true; if the
jury finds that the proponent has met the burden, they may consider the
proffered evidence during their deliberations; but if the jury finds that
the proponent has failed to sustain the burden, the jurors are "to
disregard the proffered evidence.""'
There is also agreement that the procedures are radically different
for competence facts under Rule 104(a). Again, the Advisory
Committee expressly stated that under 104(a), the trial judge functions
"as a trier of fact.""'° To effectively perform that function, the trial judge
must hear testimony both pro and con on the foundational fact.10 The
judge does not rule immediately on the opponent's objection; rather, to
enable the opponent to present his or her testimony on the foundational
fact before the judge's ruling, the judge permits the opponent to conduct
a voir dire in support of his or her objection."' In ruling, the judge
considers the foundational testimony submitted by the opponent as well
as that presented by the proponent.
While there is a solid judicial consensus on the above procedures,
there remains a troublesome point of disagreement among the courts:
the proper scope of this voir dire. In particular, there is a nagging
question as to how far the trial judge should allow the opponent to go
during voir dire in presenting evidence attacking the proponent's
foundational testimony. As the Introduction to this -Article notes, that is
precisely the question that has divided the lower courts in several recent
107. See Assembly Comm. on Jud. Comment, CAL. EVIL). CODE § 403, quoted in
IMWINKELRIED & HALLAHAN, supra note 80, at 32.
108. Id at CAL. EVID. CODE § 403(c)(1).
109. FED. R. EVID. 104(a) advisory committee note; see also United States v.
Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20,23 (1st Cir. 1977).
110. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 42, § 27(c), at 148.
111. See, e.g., United States v. Metallo, 908 F.2d 795, 799 (11th Cir. 1990), cert denied,
503 U.S. 940 (1992).
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decisions applying Daubert. There is pre-Rules, common-law authority
that during the voir dire the opponent is not limited to questioning the
proponent's foundational testimony; the judge "has discretion to admit
extrinsic evidence on the question."1 12 For instance, at common law, the
factual questions determining the competency of a prospective witness
fell under the competence procedure. Before the judge ruled finally on
a challenge to the prospective witness's competency, the judge could
entertain testimony about "mental and psychological tests... and
opinion evidence of psychiatric experts.""' As previously stated, in
Huddleston' and Bourjaily'5 the Supreme Court strongly implied that a
judge ruling under 104(a) may pass on the credibility of the foundational
testimony presented by both sides. In post-Rules decisions, a number of
lower courts have gone further and expressly stated that the judge may
do so.1 6 Yet, even at this late date-almost three quarters of a century
after the birth of the modem theory of preliminary factfinding-there
are only a few, scattered precedents specifically addressing the question
of which factors a judge may consider in evaluating the credibility of the
foundational testimony. Those precedents allow the trial judge to weigh
such considerations as the foundational witness's demeanor,117  a
witness's inconsistent statements at other hearings, the witness's
medical records,19 psychiatric assessments of the witness's mental
121auhrtefaoa
condition,'2 and other expert opinions. Yet, other authorities favor a
112. Henry Weihofen, Testimonial Competence and Credibility, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
53,55 (1966).
113. Id.
114. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988).
115. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 180-81 (1987).
116. See Precision Piping & Instruments, Inc. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 951
F.2d 613, 621 (4th Cir. 1991) ("credibility determinations"); Earle v. Benoit, 850 F.2d 836, 842
(1st Cir. 1988) (the trial judge must "weigh the evidence and assess its credibility"); United
States v. Nichols, 695 F.2d 86, 91 (5th Cir. 1982) ("judging the credibility of the [foundational]
witness is a matter for the trial court"); United States v. Martorano, 557 F.2d 1, 12 (1st Cir.
1977) ("weight"), cerL denied, 435 U.S. 922 (1978); United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20,
23 n.2 (1st Cir. 1977) ("weight").
117. See 1 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE §104.16[4][b], at 104-58 n.39 (2d ed. 2000)
(citing Precision Piping, 951 F.2d at 621).
118. l. § 104.14[2], at 104-32 n.4 (citing Haggins v. Warden, Fort Pillor State Farm, 715
F.2d 1050, 1055-58 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1071 (1984)).
119. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 42, § 25, at 141 n.9 (citing United States
v. Crosby, 462 F.2d 1201, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
120. See id. § 25, at 139 n.1 (citing United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367 (5th Cir.
1981)).
121. See United States v. Brown, 479 F. Supp. 1247, 1255 n.10 (D. Md. 1979) ("When a
question is raised as to the competency of a witness to testify, it is for the judge to decide. He
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narrow scope for the voir dire and insist that the opponent should not be
permitted to convert the voir dire into a wide-ranging cross-
examination.'
Thus, the question is squarely posed: during voir dire is the
opponent strictly limited to presenting evidence that speaks directly to
the merits of the issue of the validity of the scientific theory or technique
in question, or may the opponent also submit evidence that attacks the
credibility of the proponent's foundation? Neither the statutes nor the
Supreme Court decisions answer that question.'3 The ensuing sections
of this article attempt to resolve that question.
Ill. AN IDENTIFICATION OF THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS THAT
SHOULD SHAPE THE SCOPE OF VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION UNDER
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 104(a)
Section II noted that while there is a substantial judicial consensus
over the proper factfinding procedures under Rules 104(a) and 104(b),
one issue remains unsettled: the scope of voir dire examination under
Rule 104(a). Section IV of this article evaluates several possible models
for the scope of voir dire examination. However, before we can
critically evaluate the models, we must identify the policy factors
relevant to the evaluation. Three come to mind.
One policy consideration cuts in favor of according the voir dire a
broad scope. That consideration is that the scope must be expansive
enough to enable the trial judge to make an intelligent ruling on the
question of whether the proponent has established by a preponderance
of the foundational testimony that the proffered expert's reasoning is
methodologically sound. The Supreme Court has already decided that
the resolution of that question ought to be assigned to the trial judge
under Rule 104(a). 24 Moreover, as we have seen, that decision is
defensible. It would be unsound to allocate that decision to the jurors
under Rule 104(b); the length of the typical scientific evidence
foundation, the factor of depth of processing, and the probabilistic
nature of the foundational testimony concur to create a grave risk that
exposure to the foundational testimony would distort the jurors'
deliberations even if at a conscious level they decided that the scientific
evidence was technically inadmissible. If the judge is to shield the jury
may call to his aid the testimony of expert witnesses.").
122. See Imwinkelried, supra note 11, at 61.
123. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 42, § 5053, at 261.
124. See Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,592 (1993).
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from "junk" science"- by separating the wheat from the chaff, the judge
must have access to enough information to make his or her decision on a
rational, non-arbitrary basis.
However, two countervailing policies cut in the opposite direction
and favor according voir dire a relatively narrow scope. One
countervailing policy is the concern that expanding the scope of the voir
dire will enable the trial judge to undercut the trial jury's power. While
Rule 104(a) empowers the judge to decide the factual questions
conditioning the application of evidentiary competence rules, the trial
judge may not invade the jury's province' by usurping the jury's role as
factfinder with respect to the substantive issues in the case.'2'
This factor will frequently come into play when the voir dire deals
with the foundation for scientific evidence. As previously stated, expert
testimony is often offered at contemporary trials. 8 Moreover, such
testimony is frequently outcome determinative. In a civil tort action, a
ruling excluding the plaintiff's expert medical causation testimony might
render the plaintiff's case vulnerable to a defense summary judgment
motion. 9 Likewise, the prosecution might never get to the jury if the
judge determines that its expert trace evidence,' linking the accused to
the crime scene, is inadmissible. In Daubert, the Court cautioned the
trial judiciary against overstepping its bound. While the Court tasked
trial judges to decide whether the proffered expert's reasoning rests on
validated "principles and methodology,""'3 in the next breath the Court
added that trial judges are not to pass on the expert's ultimate
"conclusions" 32
-the opinions that will ultimately be submitted to the
jury for their consideration.
A second and final countervailing policy is the concern that
broadening the scope of the voir dire might unduly prolong the trial.'
33
Given the interest in judicial economy, the opponent should not be
125. See PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM (1991).
126. See Saltzburg, supra note 57, at 272 n.3.
127. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 42, § 24, at 133.
128. See Gross, supra note 50, at 1119.
129. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
130. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 38, at Ch. 24.
131. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993).
132. Id.
133. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 42, § 5053, at 264 (discussing Federal Rule of
Evidence 403).
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permitted to convert the admissibility hearing into a full trialf'T by
conducting a wide-ranging cross-examination under the guise of voir
dire."' Just as scientific evidence proffers often implicate the
countervailing consideration of protecting the jury's factfinding power,
an expert foundation can trigger this policy. As previously stated, out-
of-court hearings into the admissibility of expert testimony can last
weeks and consume thousands of pages of transcript." In many
jurisdictions, trial court backlogs are still distressingly long."
Prolonging voir dires into the admissibility of expert testimony could
aggravate those backlogs.
IV. AN EVALUATION OF THE POSSIBLE MODELS OF THE SCOPE OF
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION IN TERMS OF THE PERTINENT POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS
Having identified the general policy factors which should determine
the scope of voir dire examination, we turn to an evaluation of the
possible specific models of the scope of voir dire examination. At the
polar extremes are a broad view, which authorizes the judge to consider
any evidence at all logically relevant to the credibility of the proponent's
foundational testimony, and several variations of a narrow view, which
perhaps strictly confines the opponent to testimony that can be elicited
from the proponent's own witnesses. The final part of this section
considers a compromise view: limiting the trial judge to the
consideration of evidence of relatively direct relevance to the credibility
of the proponent's evidence and even that type of evidence only when
there is a lively dispute over that credibility.
134. See 1 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 104.11[3], at 104-16 n.9 (2d ed. 2000)
(citing United States v. Leight, 818 F.2d 1297, 1303-04 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 958
(1987)).
135. See Imwinkelried, supra note 11, at 61.
136. See State v. Aquilera, 25 Cr. L. (BNA) 2189 (Fla. County Ct. May 7, 1979); People
v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
137. See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 4-7 (1990); Edward J.
Imwinkelried, The Pretrial Importance and Adaptation of the 'Trial' Evidence Rules, 25 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 965, 974-75 (1992) (collecting data demonstrating "[t]he tremendous backlog on
civil trial calendars in most metropolitan areas in the United States").
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A. The Broad View that During the Voir Dire, the Trial Judge Should
Permit the Opponent to Submit any Testimony Logically Relevant to the
Credibility of the Proponent's Foundational Testimony
Even this view would stop short of reinstating the English practice
that empowered the trial judge to decide all the factual questions
conditioning the admissibility of testimony. Under that practice, the
judge resolved even the conditional relevance questions now governed
by Federal Rule 104(b). In contrast, this view is a proposal for the scope
of the voir dire examination that the opponent is generally entitled to
conduct under Rule 104(a). Thus, even this view would not allow the
trial judge to finally decide conditional relevance issues.
At least at first blush, there seems to be a strong statutory
construction case for the broad view. The starting point for the case is
the wording of Federal Rule of Evidence 402. In pertinent part, that
statute reads: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress,
by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority." The text of the statute makes no
mention of case or decisional law. The Federal Rules took effect in
1975. In 1978, the Reporter for the Federal Rules Advisory Committee,
the late Professor Edward Cleary, released an oft-cited law review
article discussing the interpretation of the Rules. In that article,
Professor Cleary declared: "In principle, under the Federal Rules no
common law of evidence remains." '139 In a mid-1980s decision, the
United States Supreme Court approvingly quoted that passage. '4 The
Court did so again in 1993 in the course of its opinion in Daubert. 14 The
Court relied on Rule 402 as the cornerstone for its conclusion that the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence impliedly overturned the
traditional, common-law rule requiring the proponent of scientific
evidence to demonstrate that the evidence rested on a generally
accepted scientific theory or technique.142 The Daubert Court could not
find any statutory language in the Federal Rules which could reasonably
bear the interpretation that Congress intended to preserve the common-
law standard intact. Under Rule 402, that omission sufficed to
138. FED. R. EVID. 402.
139. Edward Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB. L.
REV. 908, 915 (1978).
140. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 51-52 (1984).
141. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,588 (1993).
142. See id. at 587.
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"supersede[]" the common-law Frye test.143
An advocate of the broad view of voir dire might argue by analogy
that whatever the common-law limitations on the scope of voir dire
might have been, Rule 402 invalidated those limitations, just as it
overturned the general acceptance test. However, that argument
misconceives the function of Rule 402. Rule 402 is indeed designed to
abolish uncodified substantive evidentiary restrictions.1" However, the
issue of the scope of voir dire under Rule 104(a) is essentially
procedural. The Federal Rules of Evidence are silent on many
procedural questions related to the administration of substantive
evidentiary rules. For example, the Rules contain no provision
prescribing the scope of a case-in-chief, a rebuttal case, redirect, or
recross. The Supreme Court has recognized that the Federal Rules do
not prescribe a complete set of procedural rules for applying substantive
evidence law. In Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey,145 the question
presented was whether the common-law rule of completeness had
survived the adoption of the Federal Rules. This common-law rule
provides that after the proponent introduces part of an item of evidence
such as a letter during one examination of a witness such as direct, on
the next phase of examination, such as cross, the opponent may
introduce other relevant parts of the same item.1" Federal Rule of
Evidence 106 sets out a very different version of the rule, entitling the
opponent to force the proponent to introduce the part favoring the
opponent when the introduction of only the part favoring the proponent
might mislead the jury. '47 The question arose whether Rule 106
impliedly abolished the common-law completeness rule. The Court
concluded that the Federal Rules were not intended to function as a
self-contained set of procedural rules. The Court, therefore, ruled that
the common-law procedure had survived the enactment of the Federal
Rules.
In the final analysis, the question of what evidence the judge may
receive during a Rule 104(a) voir dire is a procedural scope issue rather
than one of substantive evidentiary doctrine. When the proponent
objects to the opponent's attempt to introduce testimony attacking the
143. Id. at 588.
144. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Whether the Federal Rules of Evidence Should Be
Conceived as a Perpetual Index Code: Blindness Is Worse than Myopia, 40 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1595 (1999).
145. 488 U.S. 153 (1988).
146. See 1 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 32.
147. FED. R. EVID. 106; see also 1 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 32.
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credibility of the proponent's foundation, the proponent is not invoking
a substantive evidentiary doctrine such as hearsay or best evidence."4
Consequently, Rule 402 is inapposite. Rather, as at common law, the
judiciary is free to shape the scope of a Rule 104(a) voir dire in light of
the relevant policy considerations.
Those considerations counsel against embracing the broadest view of
the scope of voir dire examination. To begin with, much of the
testimony admissible in open court to attack the weight of the
proponent's scientific evidence will have minimal probative value during
the voir dire inquiry. In open court in the jury's hearing, the opponent's
best attack is often that the proponent has not used the very best
technique which modem science has to offer. '49 By way of example,
when the prosecution's forensic expert has employed a conventional
optical microscope with a maximum magnification of 2000 times, the
defense can point out that the expert neglected to use a scanning
electron microscope (SEM) with magnifications exceeding 200,000
times.'" The defense can argue that there is lingering reasonable doubt
in the case because the proponent's expert did not capitalize on the state
of the scientific art. However, at the admissibility stage "[t]he test of
admissibility is not whether a particular scientific opinion has the best
foundation, or even whether the opinion is supported by the best
methodology ... Rather, the dispositive question is whether the
proponent has presented enough testimony to persuade the judge by a
preponderance of the foundational testimony that the proponent's
expert's reasoning rests on sound methodology.'52
The probative value of the opponent's testimony proffered to attack
the credibility of the proponent's foundation may be particularly
negligible when the state of the record does not present a classic
swearing contest. At some adjudicative hearings, there is little or no
dispute over the witnesses' credibility. As a practical matter, the
testimony about the underlying facts may be undisputed.53 For
148. Indeed, the proponent cannot do so. The final sentence of Rule 104(a) reads: "In
making its determination [the trial court] is not bound by the [substantive] rules of evidence
except those with respect to privileges." FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
149. See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE METHODS OF ATTACKING SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE § 10-8 (2d ed. 1992).
150. See Id. at § 10-8, at 300.
151. In re TMI Litigation, 193 F.3d 613, 665 (3rd Cir. 1999).
152. See Edward J. Imwinkelied, Should the Courts Incorporate a Best Evidence Rule
Into the Standard Determining the Admissibility of Scientific Testimony?: Enough Is Enough
Even When It Is Not the Best, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 19 (1999).
153. See RONALD L. CARLSON & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, DYNAMICS OF TRIAL
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example, at a Daubert hearing, the opponent might virtually concede the
truthfulness of the proponent's expert's testimony about her research
but contend that the opponent's expert's testimony about a separate
research project overpowers the proponent's testimony.'T m Daubert is a
case in point. In that case, the plaintiff relied in part on a reanalysis of
epidemiological data. The defense did not respond by claiming that the
plaintiff's expert was lying. Rather, the defense countered that thirty
published epidemiological studies had reached a contrary finding."5
Worse still, the broad view poses the countervailing dangers,
identified in Section III, to the nth degree. Under the broad view,
during voir dire the opponent would be entitled to submit to the trial
judge virtually any evidence that could be received in open court in the
jury's hearing.'M  At the admissibility stage, the trial judge could hear
every iota of the testimony later submissible to the jury. That practice
not only maximizes the danger that the judge will supplant the jury's
factfinding function; in some cases, it would also result in an
admissibility hearing every bit as drawn out as the portion of the trial on
the merits devoted to the consideration of the scientific testimony. In
sum, on balance the broad view is unacceptable.
B. Narrow Views of the Scope of Voir Dire Examination Under Rule
104(a)
There are several conceivable formulations of a narrow view of the
scope of voir dire. For example, a court inclined to constrict voir dire
might announce that its scope is limited in any of the following fashions:
the opponent may present only testimony that specifically contradicts
the face of the proponent's foundational testimony; the opponent may
not present testimony about any factor that the jury is capable of
assessing during the trial on the merits in open court; the opponent may
present only testimony that is relevant solely to the admissibility of the
proponent's evidence and not to its weight; the opponent is restricted to
PRACTICE § 14.2 (2d ed. 1995) (distinguishing between credibility contests and cases which
turn on the application of a legal standard to formally or virtually undisputed testimony).
154. See David L. Faigman et al., How Good Is Enough?-Expert Evidence Under
Daubert and Kumho, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 645 (2000).
155. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,582 (1993).
156. In truth, the opponent would be entitled to present more evidence to the judge than
the opponent could submit to the jury in open court. The final sentence of Rule 104(a) states
that the technical exclusionary rules such as hearsay are inapplicable to foundational
testimony. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a); State v. Cardone, 368 A.2d 952, 955 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1976).
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"intrinsic" impeachment, that is, impeaching facts which the opponent
can elicit during cross-examination of the proponent's expert; or the
opponent may introduce impeachment relevant to the merits of the
scientific issue but may not resort to ad hominem impeachment
techniques such as cross-examination about the witness's prior
untruthful conduct. '57 Each of these formulations would promote the
countervailing policies mentioned in Section III; but on scrutiny,
conceived as a hard-and-fast limitation on the scope of voir dire, each
formulation is badly flawed.
1. The Opponent May Present Only Testimony Which Specifically
Contradicts the Face of the Proponent's Foundational Testimony
Suppose that after the plaintiff proponent called one researcher as
an expert witness to vouch for a new medical causation theory, the
defendant called another expert who had participated in the same
research project. By virtue of this view, the defendant could elicit its
expert's testimony differently describing the underlying data or
reporting different findings. However, under this view the defendant
could not go beyond the face of the proponent's testimony by showing
that the proponent's witness had a directly relevant bias. Assume that
in the instant case, the expert did not use a pre-existing scientific
methodology or technique to evaluate the facts in the pending case;
rather, the attorney calling the expert hired the expert to develop the
scientific technique in question specifically for purposes of the
litigation.'58 This view would bar inquiry about even that powerful
source of bias. The view suffers both as a matter of statutory
construction and as a matter of policy.
The statutory interpretation case against this view is persuasive. If
the opponent cannot go behind the proponent's testimony with rebuttal
testimony attacking its credibility, in effect a Rule 104(a) hearing
becomes a Rule 104(b) hearing. In a Rule 104(b) hearing on a
conditional relevance issue, the judge accepts the proponent's
foundational testimony at face value.9  The Supreme Court
acknowledged the limited nature of the judicial inquiry under Rule
104(b) in Huddleston.'6° The Court stated that Rule 104(b) precludes
157. See FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
158. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317-18 (9th Cir. 1995)
(Kozinski, J.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 869 (1995).
159. See Imwinkelried, supra note 11, at 64-65.
160. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988).
[Vol. 84:1
2000] TRIAL JUDGES-GATEKEEPERS OR USURPERS? 2
the trial judge from weighing the credibility of the testimony."" By
restricting the opponent to testimony specifically contradicting the face
of the proponent's testimony, this view of the scope of Rule 104(a) voir
dire confines the judge to the face of the testimony. It is hard to believe
that Congress contemplated the same mode of analysis under Rule
104(a). When the Supreme Court initially revisited Daubert in General
Electric Co. v. Joiner, 2 the Court asserted that the trial judge need not
accept "the ipse dixit of the expert. 16 It is difficult, if not impossible, to
square that assertion with any view confining the judge to an analysis of
the face of the foundational testimony.
This view also suffers from a policy perspective. If the opponent and
judge are confined to the face of the foundational testimony, the judge
will be deprived of the information needed to intelligently resolve a true
swearing contest between the experts. The judge needs an independent
basis for preferring one witness's facially sufficient testimony over
similar testimony by another witness when the opposing witnesses are
equally well credentialed. If the opponent cannot furnish the judge with
the information needed to go beyond the face of the foundational
testimony, the judge will be forced to make an arbitrary decision: either
the judge will have to admit the evidence because, as under Rule 104(b),
the face of the proponent's foundational testimony creates a permissive
inference that the opinion rests on sound methodology, or the judge will
have to exclude the proponent's evidence whenever the opponent
presents more foundational testimony than the proponent. If the judge
is strictly limited to the face of the foundational testimony, those are the
only options open to the judge. The judge will be denied the
information necessary to make a true, informed credibility
determination. The second option is especially offensive. If the
opponent is entitled to prevail whenever he or she submits more
foundational testimony, the admissibility rules will be skewed in favor of
the wealthy. Expert testimony can be quite expensive." In a given
case, there might be a huge disparity in economic resources between the
itigants1 o If the judge cannot critically evaluate the quality and
161. See id.
162. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
163. Id. at 146.
164. See Robyn L. Thieman, Property Devaluation Caused by Fear of Electromagnetic
Fields: Using Damages to Encourage Utilities to Act Efficiently, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1386, 1406
(1996).
165. See MICHAEL J. SAKS & RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE IN LIGATION 60 (1983).
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credibility of the foundational testimony, by default the judge might be
forced to rely on the quantity of the testimony. If the admissibility
ruling is made to turn on the quantum of evidence presented by the
litigants, the admissibility standard will systemically disadvantage those
who have difficulty affording experts.6 By skewing the admissibility
standard, this narrow view would increase the probability that only the
affluent will be able to afford justice
2. The Opponent May Not Present Testimony About Any Factor Which
the Jury is Capable of Assessing During the Trial on the Merits in Open
Court
Like the first formulation of a narrow view, this view has a
superficial attractiveness. This view seems to secure the jury's
independent factfinding role by precluding the judge at the admissibility
stage from considering any testimony about factors which the jury is
competent to evaluate during the trial on the merits. However, this view
rests on a misunderstanding of the boundary between Rules 104(a) and
104(b); and if adopted, this view would preclude the judge from
considering virtually any foundational rebuttal testimony from the
opponent.
Revisit the earlier analysis of privilege questions decided under Rule
104(a). Assume again that a litigant makes a privilege objection and the
record develops that the objection turns on the question of whether the
client realized that a third party outsider was standing within easy
earshot. All jurisdictions assign the resolution of that question to the
judge. However, the issue is not allocated to the judge because the jury
is incapable of intelligently deciding that question. Quite to the
contrary, "[n]o one doubts the jury's competence to decide whether a
person was physically present when the attorney and client conversed;
the issue of a person's presence at a particular time and place is a
simple, straightforward question that jurors can easily resolve."' 6 There
is nothing particularly arcane or esoteric about the question. We assign
the question to the judge for an altogether different reason: the fear
that having been exposed to the foundational testimony about the
contents of the privileged statement and the surrounding circumstances,
the jury would find it difficult to later ignore the statement if they found
the statement to be technically privileged and inadmissible.
166. See Person v. Ass'n of the Bar of New York, 414 F. Supp. 144, 145 (E.D.N.Y. 1976),
rev'd, 554 F.2d 534 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 924 (1977).
167. Imwinkelried, supra note 59, at 617.
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If the courts applied this narrow view to the foundation for scientific
evidence, they would deny the judge a wide range of necessary
information. It is true that there have been relatively few studies of the
competence of lay jurors to critically gauge expert testimony, but for the
most part the available data indicates that jurors are up to the task.'6' In
Daubert, the Supreme Court voiced its confidence in the general ability
of the jury to decide how much weight to attach to scientific testimony. 69
Under this narrow view, if the judge concludes that the jury is
competent to evaluate the testimony about a particular facet of the
scientific technique in question, the judge could not consider the
testimony in ruling on admissibility. Assuming that the jury is able to
analyze the testimony related to most aspects of the alleged scientific
merit of a technique, the judge would be precluded from weighing the
testimony. The net result would be to cripple the judge's factfinding
under Rule 104(a).
3. The Opponent May Present Only Testimony Which is Relevant
Solely to the Admissibility of the Proponent's Testimony and Not to its
Weight
In the case of some items of proffered evidence, there will be a
clearcut, discernible difference between the testimony relevant to its
admissibility and the testimony pertinent to its weight. Consider, for
example, the privilege hypothetical. In that case, the admissibility of the
allegedly privileged statement will depend on whether there was
physical privacy at the time of the communication between the client
and attorney. If there was privacy, the privilege can attach and render
the statement inadmissible. However, in most cases70 the presence or
absence of the third party has no impact on either the truthfulness or
168. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Critique
from the Perspective of Juror Psychology, 28 VILL. L. REV. 554, 567-68 (1983) (collecting
studies); Richard Rogers & Charles Patrick Ewing, Ultimate Opinion Proscriptions: A
Cosmetic Fix and a Plea for Empiricism, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 357, 363 (1989) (collecting
studies).
169. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,595-96 (1993).
170. There are cases in which the declarant's realization that he or she is speaking in
public will affect the reliability of the statement. For example, part of the rationale for the
declaration against interest hearsay exception is that the declarant would not reveal the
statement unless he or she believed it to be true. See 2 McCORMICK, EVIDENCE Ch. 33. The
realization that he or she is making a public assertion is also a contributing factor to the
rationale for admitting documents under the official record hearsay exception. See 5 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1632 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
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objective truth of the statement. 7' Applying the proposed narrow view,
the judge could consider the testimony about the third party's presence;
that testimony would be logically relevant to the admissibility of the
testimony but not to its weight.
However, in the case of many other foundations, including the
foundation for scientific evidence, that distinction will prove to be
unworkable. The testimony submitted to the judge under Daubert
because it is relevant to admissibility will also be logically relevant to the
weight of the testimony, if admitted. In Daubert, the Court provided
trial judges with a list of the factors which inter alia" the judges should
consider in determining the admissibility of proffered scientifictestimony:173 whether the underlying hypothesis is empirically testable,
whether it has been tested, whether the hypothesis has been subjected to
peer review and publication, whether the technique has a known or
potential error rate, whether there are standards controlling the
technique's operation, and whether the hypothesis enjoys general
acceptance in the pertinent specialty fields. 4 All of those factors are
obviously relevant to the weight of the testimony. 5 Hence, even if a
judge decided to admit testimony about a scientific technique despite a
15% margin of error, the opponent would certainly be entitled to
establish the error margin in an attempt to convince the jury to attach
less weight to the testimony. The upshot is that the application of this
formulation of the narrow view to a foundation for scientific evidence
would be disastrous. Since almost all the evidence relevant to
admissibility under Daubert would also be relevant to the weight of the
testimony, the judge would be left with virtually no basis for making an
informed admissibility decision.
171. See CARLSON & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 153, § 7.2(F), at 131.
172. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (the Court
expressly stated that the list was not "a definitive checklist").
173. See id. at 593-94.
174. Under the Daubert test, general acceptance is demoted from the status of a test in
and of itself to being a mere factor in evaluating the empirical validation of the hypothesis. If
the hypothesis has gained general acceptance, that is circumstantial evidence that experts in
the field have studied the underlying methodology and found it to be satisfactory. Id.
175. See generally IMWINKELRIED, supra note 149, at Ch. 10.
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4. The Opponent Is Restricted to "Intrinsic" Impeachment, That is,
Impeaching Facts Which the Opponent Can Elicit During Cross-
Examination of the Proponent's Expert
The common law of evidence distinguished between "intrinsic" and
"extrinsic" impeachment."6 When the opponent was limited to
"intrinsic" impeachment, the opponent was restricted to testimony
which he or she could elicit during the cross-examination of the
proponent's witness. If only "intrinsic" impeachment were permissible,
the opponent had to "take the witness's answer"; after the witness was
excused from the stand, the opponent could not call another witness or
present documentary evidence to contradict the prior witness's
answer." In contrast, if "extrinsic" impeachment was allowed, at a later
point in the trial the opponent could present another witness or
introduce other evidence to attack the earlier witness's credibility.Y8 As
previously stated, one of the policy concerns relevant to the scope of
voir dire is preventing the opponent from converting the admissibility
hearing into a full trial.'79 It would certainly promote that policy to
confine the opponent during voir dire to intrinsic impeachment.
Suppose that the opponent's foundational testimony was not relevant to
the scientific merit of the technique but was relevant only to impeaching
the credibility of the proponent's foundation. In that event, this view
would restrict the opponent to cross-examination of the proponent's
witness; no matter how the proponent's witness responded, the
opponent could not later offer rebuttal testimony during the voir dire.
The opponent would have to wait until the trial in open court to offer
such testimony.
Of the formulations considered to date, this version of the narrow
view has the most plausibility. However, even this view is of dubious
wisdom because it will often result in forcing the trial judge to make the
credibility determination on an inferior basis. Consider several
hypothetical applications of this formulation. If the opponent is
restricted to "intrinsic" impeachment, the opponent could probably
attack the witness's credibility by pointing to his or her demeanor"
during cross-examination; but the opponent could not offer extrinsic
176. See 1 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 36.
177. See id. § 41.
178. See id. § 36.
179. See 1 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 104.11[43], at 104-16 n.9 (2d ed. 2000).
180. See id. § 104.16[4][b], at 104-58 n.39 (citing Precision Piping & Instruments, Inc. v.
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 951 F.2d 613,621 (4th Cir. 1991)).
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evidence establishing the witness's bias. However, the most recent
psychological research indicates that a witness's demeanor on the stand
can be so idiosyncratic that it is often an unreliable indicator of the
witness's truthfulness."" Extensive psychological research documents
that bias, including subconscious attitudes,' can have a tremendously
distorting impact on a witness's trial testimony.'3 In Davis v. Alaska,",,
the Supreme Court indicated that in its opinion, bias is especially
probative of a witness's credibility. Extrinsic evidence of the witness's
bias might be far more probative than the witness's demeanor intrinsic
to cross-examination.
Consider another illustration. If the opponent is strictly limited to
"intrinsic" impeachment, the opponent could conceivably be restricted
to exploring inconsistencies between passages in the witness's trial
testimony-a statement on direct and another statement made on cross.
However, extrinsic evidence of a statement the witness made pretrial
during the research project could be of greater significance. Further,
when the pretrial statement had been reduced to writing such as an
entry in the researcher's notebook, its consideration would require little
additional expenditure of court time even if the witness denied making
the statement. The foundation to authenticate the entry could be short,
requiring little court time.'" In this hypothetical, enforcing a rigid
restriction to "intrinsic" impeachment would deprive the judge of highly
probative information which impinged to only a minimal extent on the
policy of judicial economy.
5. The Opponent May Use Impeachment Techniques Relevant to the
Merits of the Scientific Issue But May Not Resort to Ad Hominem
Impeachment Techniques
While impeachment evidence is sometimes classified on the basis of
whether it is "intrinsic" or "extrinsic" to the cross-examination of the
witness to be impeached, impeachment techniques can be roughly
181. See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, a Lick of the Lips: The Validity of
Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1157, 1204 (1994); Olin
Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075 (1991); see also In re Cudjo, 977
P.2d 66, 75 (Cal. 1999) ("Observing the demeanor of an expert is generally of little or no
benefit in evaluating the persuasive value of the expert's opinion testimony").
182. See United States v. Hively, 547 F. Supp. 318, 320 (M.D. Pa. 1982).
183. See Felice J. Levine & June Louin Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification:
The Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1079, 1106 (1973).
184. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
185. See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS Ch. 4 (4th ed.
1998).
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categorized on another basis. According to this categorization, some
impeachment techniques are ad hominem attacks on the witness while
other impeachment techniques have a more direct bearing on the
credibility of the particular testimony given by the witness in the case.'
For example, for impeachment, the opponent can show that the
proponent's witness suffers from a mental illness which generally
impairs the caliber of the witness's memory."8 The impeachment is ad
hominem; the target is the witness himself or herself, and proof of a
generalized memory deficiency would probably be relevant regardless of
the content of the witness's testimony in the pending case. However,
proof of a prior inconsistent statement "focus[es] on the witness's
testimony rather than the witness's personal background.'" In the
Third Circuit case mentioned in the Introduction, Judge Becker may
have had this distinction in mind when he wrote that the majority
"confuses the reliability of an expert witness-a matter for the jury-
with the reliability of his or her methodology-a matter initially for the
trial judge."'" If the policy objective is to arm the trial judge with the
information needed to make an intelligent 104(a) ruling while respecting
the jurors' province to evaluate the witness's credibility, this proposed
distinction is appealing. By permitting impeachment relevant to the
witness's specific testimony in the instant case, this formulation would
provide the judge with the requisite information; and by banning ad
hominem impeachment, this formulation would help protect the jury's
prerogative from judicial intrusion.
Although the basic thrust of this distinction is sensible, the
distinction can become blurry, and even this distinction cannot be
enforced as a full-fledged rule of law. As a general proposition, proof of
a. witness's sensory or mental defect might have minimal bearing on the
witness's testimony in the pending case.' 9 However, suppose that the
witness's research entailed the use of color change tests such as the
Duquesnois-Levine method of identifying unknown drugs.'9' In that
186. See RONALD L. CARLSON, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED & EDWARD J. KIONKA,
EVIDENCE IN THE NINETIES: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 342-43, 365, 383, 421 (3d
ed. 1991).
187. See id at 421.
188. Id at 365.
189. In re UNISYS Say. Plan Litig., 173 F.3d 145, 161 (3rd Cir. 1999) (Becker, C.J.,
dissenting).
190. See 1 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 44.
191. See 2 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
§ 23-2(B) (3d ed. 1999).
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setting, proof of the witness's color blindness could raise grave questions
about the accuracy of the witness's research observations. Again, proof
of a witness's untruthful conduct' 9' or prior conviction'9' would ordinarily
be classic examples of purely ad hominem attacks on the witness's
believability. Suppose, though, that the conduct amounted to fraud in a
phase of the very research project the witness relies on to validate his or
her hypothesis. Proof of that type of misconduct has more than passing
relevance to the question of whether the witness conducted the research
with sound scientific methodology. In the case of the impeachment
technique of prior inconsistent statement, the common-law courts
developed the collateral fact rule to identify statements which were
relevant enough to the facts of the case to justify the receipt of extrinsic
impeaching evidence.'" The extrinsic evidence was admissible if the
prior statement relates to an important, "non-collateral" issue while the
evidence was excluded when its only relevance was to a "collateral"
issue.' 5 However, in the final analysis, the common-law experiment
with a collateral fact "rule" failed.' The "mechanistic "'9, application of
the purported rule often frustrated the "pertinent policy
considerations."9''  The drafters of the California Evidence Code
abandoned the doctrine as an "inflexible rule,"'" and the federal
drafters arguably followed suit.wo
C. The Compromise View that as a General Norm, When There is a
Genuine Credibility Dispute, the Opponent May Introduce Impeaching
Evidence That Has Relatively Direct Relevance to the Dispute
Rather than attempting to regulate the scope of voir dire by
"inflexible rule," it would make more sense to announce a general
norm, giving the trial judge flexibility to adjust the scope to the policies
implicated by the specific facts of the case. In Joiner, the Supreme
Court stated that the trial judge has discretion in applying the factors
192. See 1 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 41.
193. See Id § 42.
194. See Id. § 49.
195. See Id
196. See Id.
197. 1 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 49, at 78.
198. Id.
199. Cal. Law Revision Comm'n Comment, C.E.C. 780, quoted in IMWINKELRIED &
HALLAHAN, supra note 80, at 116.
200. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of Evidence 402: The Second Revolution,
6 REv. LrIG. 129, 149-51 (1987).
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which Daubert mentioned as being relevant to assessing the foundation
for scientific evidence." In Kumho, the Court granted the trial judiciary
another type of discretion.' There the Court held that when the
challenge is evaluating the admissibility of non-scientific testimony, the
trial judge has "considerable leeway in... identif[ying] the specific
factors [which are] reasonable measures of the reliability of" the
proffered testimony. The proposed compromise view would accord
trial judges still a third kind of discretion, namely, over the scope of the
voir dire examination conducted under Rule 104(a).
During voir dire, before allowing the opponent to introduce
testimony impeaching the proponent's foundational testimony, the trial
judge should exercise his or her discretion in determining both that
there is a lively dispute over credibility and that the proffered testimony
has relatively direct relevance to the credibility dispute.
1. A Genuine Credibility Dispute
In this context, what does a "lively"' " or genuine credibility dispute
denote? In some cases, even though there is a pitched battle over the
admissibility of the proponent's scientific evidence, the battle does not
pose any credibility questions for the judge. Suppose that without
questioning the data relied on by the proponent's expert, the opponent
calls other experts who used a different scientific method yielding
contrary results. For instance, while the proponent's expert based his
opinion on animal studies, the opponent's expert might rely on an
epidemiological analysis pointing to a different conclusion. In this state
of the record, the judge must decide the extent to which the opponent's
foundational testimony undermines the inference that the proponent's
expert used sound scientific methodology. However, given the nature of
the opponent's attack, there is little need for the judge to consider any
testimony relevant to the sincerity or perceptual ability of the
proponent's expert. In a formal sense, the expert's credibility comes
into issue as soon as the witness gives any testimony in the case.'
However, in this variation of the hypothetical, in a realistic sense the
witness's credibility is not a meaningful issue.
201. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146-47 (1997).
202. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
203. Id. at 152.
204. Cf Mark E. Turcott, Similar Fact Evidence: The Boardman Legacy, 21 CRIM. L.Q.
43,66 (1979).
205. See 1 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 33, at 122.
206. See Thompson v. United States, 546 A.2d 414 (D.C. 1988).
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Suppose, however, that during the voir dire the opponent calls
another member of the research team which generated the very data the
proponent's expert is relying on. The opponent's expert not only
testifies to different underlying data but also draws diametrically
opposed inferences from the research data. Here the opponent's
submission creates a genuine credibility dispute. The testimony of the
proponent's expert is at loggerheads with the testimony of the
opponent's expert. One of the witnesses is either lying or mistaken. If
the judge is to avoid ruling on an essentially arbitrary basis, the judge
must be able to go beyond the face of the testimony describing the
research data and findings. Credibility evidence would serve as a
rational basis for resolving this dispute. Faced with a true credibility
dispute, the judge has an acute need for evidence speaking directly to
credibility.
2. Evidence of Relatively Direct Relevance to the Credibility Dispute
However, given the countervailing policies of judicial economy and
protecting the jury's factfinding role, even when there is a lively
credibility dispute the judge should not permit the opponent to
introduce any and all evidence logically relevant to the credibility of the
proponent's foundation. The instinct of the final possible narrow view,
limiting the opponent to testimony bearing on the scientific merit of the
proponent's hypothesis, is a good one. Given the interests in judicial
economy and protecting the jury's prerogatives, the trial judge ought to
allow the opponent to introduce credibility evidence during voir dire
only when the evidence has great probative value on the credibility
dispute. Given that norm, apart from the witness's credentials, what
types of evidence should the judge consider, and which should the judge
bar?
To begin with, the judge may certainly consider the demeanor of the
proponent's witness while he or she is testifying about the foundational
element in question. Although demeanor is sometimes not a reliable
indicator of truthfulness or objective truth, demeanor is relevant.
Moreover, since the proponent's witness has already testified, the
judge's consideration of this factor does not necessitate the devotion of
any additional court time to the presentation of testimony by the
opponent. For that matter, the judge ought to be permitted to consider
the entirety of the proponent's witness's demeanor during his or her
foundational testimony. The contrast between the witness's demeanor
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during the Daubert testimony with the demeanor during other parts of
the testimony might give the judge some helpful insighti into the
witness's level of confidence on the Daubert topic. All that testimony
with the accompanying demeanor has already been presented, and it
does not impinge on the policy of judicial economy to permit the judge
to consider the witness's complete demeanor.
In addition, the judge may weigh the internal consistency of the
witness's foundational testimony. Are there inconsistencies between
different passages in the witness's direct testimony or between the direct
and the cross? If the proponent's witness's testimony was consistent but
the opponent's witness's testimony was marred by several
inconsistencies, the judge would have a solid basis for preferring the
former testimony over the latter.
Next, taking a step beyond the internal consistency of the trial
testimony, the judge ought to be able to consider some prior
inconsistent statements by the witness. At common law and under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, the standard for inconsistency is relaxed.
The prior statement need not be diametrically opposed to the witness's
trial testimony.' The earlier statement need merely "bend in a
different direction. "2 That lax standard would be inappropriate as the
test for introducing an inconsistent statement during voir dire
examination. It would be sounder to insist that the prior statement
flatly contradict the witness's foundational testimony. Under the
traditional standard, a witness's mere failure to mention a fact on a prior
occasion can be treated as a prior inconsistent statement. ° It is true
that even without more, such a failure could be logically relevant to a
witness's credibility, but it seems to possess so little probative value that
207. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Demeanor Impeachment: Law and Tactics, 9 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 183, 191 (1985) ("While demeanor is admittedly a fallible guide to the
witness' state of mind, the general consensus is that the witness' demeanor is a valuable clue
to his state of mind. 'For unnumbered ages the external appearance has been deemed to be
an index to the internal man....' Modernly, intelligent persons still consider demeanor in
conducting ordinary, everyday affairs and business").
208. See United States v. Cody, 114 F.3d 772, 776-77 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Matlock, 109 F.3d 1313, 1319 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Strother, 49 F.3d 869, 874 (2d
Cir. 1995); Laboy v. Demskie, 947 F. Supp. 733, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); State v. Blake, 478
S.E.2d 550,556 (W. Va. 1996).
209. J. MCNAUGHT & H. FLANNERY, MASSACHUSETS EVIDENCE: A COURTROOM
REFERENCE 13-5 (1988).
210. See United States v. Strother, 49 F.3d 869, 874 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v.
Stock, 948 F.2d 1299, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1991); State v. Paul, 495 P.2d 797 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972);
State v. Mack, 193 S.E.2d 71, 75 (N.C. 1972); State v. Brewton, 422 P.2d 581 (Or.), cert.denied,
387 U.S. 943 (1967).
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a mere failure should not be provable during voir dire.
What about a witness's bias? Bias evidence can vary greatly in the
degree of its probative worth. Like the traditional standard for
inconsistency, both at common law and under the Federal Rules the
courts "have been hospitable to the point of liberality in admitting
evidence relevant to a witness' bias."2"' The same liberality should not
obtain during voir dire examination. At the trial on the merits in most
jurisdictions, the opponent would be entitled to establish that in the
past, the witness had been employed by other similarly situated
attorneys such as other members of the plaintiffs' bar.212 There is an
inference of bias, but the inference is weak at best. Similarly, if the
attorney paid the expert to use a pre-existing scientific technique such as
gas chromatograph/mass spectrometry (GC/MS), the payment is
provable during the trial on the merits. Here again, the inference of
bias is hardly overpowering. After all, while experts occasionally donate
their services pro bono, in the vast majority of cases experts expect and
receive compensation. Contrast the extreme situation in which the
attorney has hired the expert to conduct the original research needed to
validate the technique to satisfy Daubert. Now the nexus between the
bias and the foundational testimony is much stronger. In this situation,
in Frye jurisdictions a number of courts went to the length of ruling the
witness incompetent to establish the general acceptance of the
technique. 3 On remand in Daubert, Judge Kozinski wrote:
One very significant factor to be considered is whether the
experts are proposing to testify about matters growing naturally
and directly out of research they have conducted independent of
the litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions
expressly for purposes of testifying. [I]n determining whether
proposed expert testimony amounts to good science, we may not
ignore the fact that a scientist's normal workplace is the lab or
the field, not the courtroom or the lawyer's office. 214
211. United States v. Akitoye, 923 F.2d 221, 223 (1st Cir. 1991).
212 See United States v. Edwardo-Franco, 885 F.2d 1002, 1009-10 (2d Cir. 1989); Collins
v. Wayne Corp., 621 F.2d 777, 785 (5th Cir. 1980); Trower v. Jones, 520 N.E.2d 297, 300-01
(Ill. 1988); Wrobleski v. de Lara, 708 A.2d 1086, 1089-90 (Md. 1998); Robinson v. G.G.C.,
Inc., 808 P.2d 522,527 (Nev. 1991).
213. See People v. Tobey, 257 N.W.2d 537,539-40 (Mich. 1977); Commonwealth v. Topa,
369 A.2d 1277,1281 (Pa. 1977); People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1250 (Cal. 1976).
214. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317-18 (9th Cir.), cert denied,
516 U.S. 869 (1995).
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In this situation, the bias evidence possesses the type of direct
relevance to the Daubert foundation that would warrant the receipt of
the evidence during the voir dire.
Finally, consider evidence of the witness's untruthful conduct.
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b), a cross-examiner may inquire
about such behavior even if it has not yet resulted in a conviction. 5
However, as in the case of both inconsistent statements and bias
evidence, there are gradations. Rule 608(b) would permit the cross-
examiner to ask about an untruthful act such as a fraudulent workers'
compensation claim. However, the claim has nothing to do with the
subject-matter of the witness's Daubert testimony, and it would be an
abuse of the judge's discretion to permit that inquiry during the voir
dire. What if the witness was guilty of fraud in the administration of the
funds for another scientific research project? Such fraud is certainly fair
game under Rule 608(b), but even this species of fraud would have a
tenuous connection to the Daubert foundation in the instant case.
However, it would be a completely different matter if the witness had
perpetrated fraud in an earlier phase of the research project which the
witness described in the foundational testimony."' Now there is a direct
enough connection between the untruthful conduct and the
foundational testimony that the judge would be justified in permitting
the opponent to cross-examine the proponent's witness about the
conduct.
V. CONCLUSION
Justice Holmes observed that the law is constantly drawing lines and
that "on exact scrutiny" the lines almost always prove "to [be]
debatable. 2 17 I am certain that many of the lines I have proposed in this
article will prove to be at the very least "debatable." However, given
the growing use of expert testimony at trial, it is imperative that we
begin talking about the lines that should be drawn during Daubert voir
dires under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a). For decades, the courts,
as well as the commentators, have neglected the procedural issue of the
proper scope of voir dire examination in support of an evidentiary
objection. However, the rendition of the Daubert decision has
215. FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
216. See W. BROAD & N. WADE, BETRAYERS OF THE TRUTH 83 (1983) (according to
the Food and Drug Administration, "perhaps as many as ten percent [of the clinical
researchers in the United States] do something less than [honest research]").
217. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 127 (1881).
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necessitated so many Rule 104(a) hearings that the neglect is no longer
tolerable. On the one hand, since the judge is supposed to act as a
factfinder at these hearings, the judge will sometimes need the benefit of
credibility evidence. If the judge confines his or her analysis to the face
of the foundational testimony submitted by both sides, the judge will be
forced to make an essentially arbitrary decision. When the opponent's
foundational testimony flatly contradicts the proponent's, the
contradiction creates a genuine credibility dispute, and the judge must
go beyond the face of the testimony to intelligently resolve the dispute.
On the other hand, to uphold the interest in judicial economy and
safeguard the jury's factfinding role, the courts must draw lines, sharply
limiting the types of credibility information admissible during the voir
dire. At the trial on the merits, the courts use relaxed standards for
receiving prior inconsistent statements, permitting proof of bias, and
allowing cross-examination about untruthful acts. Those lax standards
are inappropriate for voir dire. During voir dire, the trial judge should
confine the opponent to credibility evidence with greater probative
value--evidence that possesses relatively direct relevance to the
credibility dispute.
As Professor Stephen Saltzburg has noted, there has long been a
trend in American law to expand the role of the judiciary at the expense
of the trial jury.218 At early American law, the jurors had the power to
determine the law as well as the facts. 19 Today they have lost that
power in almost all states and federal court m Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has strengthened the trial judiciary's power to grant
summary judgment and thereby deny the plaintiff an opportunity to
submit his or her case to the jury.?' The preservation of the role of the
jury as a democratic institution is one of the major stakes in the
emerging controversy over the proper scope of the Daubert voir dire
under Rule 104(a). The objective must be to give trial judges adequate
218. See Salzburg, supra note 57, at 271.
219. See Stanton D. Krauss, An Inquiry into the Right of Criminal Juries to Determine the
Law in ColonialAmerica, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 111 (1998).
220. See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895); Jenkins v. Smith, 43 F. Supp. 2d 556,
558 (D. Md. 1999); RONALD L. CARLSON, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EDWARD J. KIONKA
& KRISTINE STRACHAN, EVIDENCE: TEACHING MATERIALS FOR AN AGE OF SCIENCE AND
STATUTES 114 (4th ed. 1997); David Farnham, Jury Nullification: History Proves It's Not a
New Idea, 11 CRIM. JUST. 4 (Wint. 1997).
221. See Imwinkelried, supra note 137, at 975-76 (discussing the impact of the trilogy of
Supreme Court summary judgment decisions, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242
(1986), Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), and Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)).
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factfinding power to make them effective Daubert gatekeepers while
keeping the spirit of Jacksonian democracy alive in American
courtrooms.

